I'll spare the obvious news recap and get right to the point - while everyone knows The Picture, or at least should - few people know what Saddam said between that picture & Bush War I.
Now, a foreword from Saddam Hussein, 1990:
It is natural to say that the U.S. is not like Britain, for example, with the latter's historic relations with Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq. In addition, there were no relations between Iraq and the U.S. between 1967 and 1984. One can conclude it would be difficult for the U.S. to have a full understanding of many matters in Iraq. When relations were re-established we hoped for a better understanding and for better cooperation because we too do not understand the background of many American decisions.
Ignorance is not strength, but that lesson will wait another decade-and-a-half to prove itself.
More on the flip.
If Mo Rocca is a fundit, I'm a undit - I just can't do witty commentary on such a heavy subject, so I don't bother trying. My only attempt here is to convey his sentiment regarding US interactions.
After nearly a decade US backing against Iran, he was wise enought to realize the US was only an ally of convenience as long as he battled Iran. While we supplied "goods" (including chemical & biological weapons) to aid Iraq, we protected our interests in the region under the name Operation Earnest Will. We helped him with one regional political battle in Iran, but were on the other side regarding Kuwait. While Iran regularly pissed with us (and we responded, or worse) for protecting Kuwaiti oil tankers, Iraq made their displeasure known with the USS Stark.
All of the blockquotes come from three sources (linked at the end of the diary) - a 1990 NY Times article, the declassified US government fax, and a recent Pakistani article by poet & journalist Kaleem Omar revisiting the event 15 years ago - all detailing the interview between Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, and April Glaspie, disappearing artist & former US Ambassador to Iraq. In a nutshell, Saddam requested the US Ambassador (via Egyptian president Hasni Mubarak) to discuss his upcoming invasion of Kuwait, and to guage the US response, with the guarantee that no action will happen until he speaks with Kuwait for one more attempt at diplomacy. After covertly supporting him in the Imposed War from 1980-88, he knew he couldn't count on any US support whatsoever, but wanted to ensure he'd avoid conflict with the US as a result. At least he tried...
Now, let's get into it. First, the declassified summary of the meeting:
Saddam wished to convey an important message to President Bush: Iraq wants friendship, but does the USG (US Government)? Iraq suffered 100,000's of casualties and is now so poor that war ophan pensions will soon be cut; yet rich Kuwait will not even accept OPEC discipline. Iraq is sick of war, but Kuwait has ignored diplomacy. USG maneuvers with the UAE will encourage the UAE and Kuwait to ignore conventional diplomacy. If Iraq is publicly humiliated by the USG, it will have no choice but to "respond," however illogical and self destructive that would prove.
Although not quite explicit, Saddam's message to us seemed to be that he will make a major push to cooperate with Mubarak's diplomacy, but we must try to understand Kuwaiti/UAE "selfishness" is unbearable. Ambassador made clear that we can never excuse settlement of disputes by other than peaceful means. End summary.
The historical hypocrisy is theirs, but the emphasis all mine.
When Glaspie met with Hussein and Tariq Aziz, Aziz provided a transcript of the discussion. The US State Dep't declined to comment on its accuracy, but this conversation sums it up:
TARIQ AZIZ: Our policy in OPEC opposes sudden jumps in oil prices.
HUSSEIN: Twenty-five dollars a barrel is not a high price.
GLASPIE: We have many Americans who would like to see the price go above $25 because they come from oil-producing states.
HUSSEIN: The price at one stage had dropped to $12 a barrel and a reduction in the modest Iraqi budget of $6 billion to $7 billion is a disaster.
GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.
I think the conversation speaks for itself.
We don't care about you people, just your oil. Do what you must.
Consider those words in context with our previous actions during the I-I war, and its hard to read any concern beyond that for the oil.
He then spoke about the many "blows" our relations have been subjected to since 1984, chief among them Irangate. It was after the Faw victory, Saddam said, that Iraqi misapprehensions about USG purposes began to surface again, I.E., suspicions that the U.S. was not happy to see the war end.
Emphasis mine. How prescient.
He states his desire to attack Kuwait, we state no official stance regarding Arab-Arab conflict. He states his desire to see OPEC standards followed and he'll keep the oil flowing, we agree and smile. But then the signals began to shift. The "plausable deniability" loophole is set in motion, as Kaleem Omar deftly points out:
At a Washington press conference called the next day (July 26, 1990), US State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutweiler was asked by journalists:
"Has the United States sent any type of diplomatic message to the Iraqis about putting 30,000 troops on the border with Kuwait? Has there been any type of protest communicated from the United States government?"
To which Tutweiler responded
"I’m entirely unaware of any such protest."
On July 31, 1990, two days before the Iraqi invasion, John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, testified to Congress that the
"United States has no commitment to defend Kuwait and the US has no intention of defending Kuwait if it is attacked by Iraq."
The trap had been baited very cleverly by Glaspie, reinforced by Tutweiler’s and Kelly’s supporting comments. And Saddam Hussein walked right into it, believing that the US would do nothing if his troops invaded Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, eight days after Glaspie’s meeting with the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein’s massed troops invaded Kuwait.
And we know what has happened since then.
His army was weak from the Iran war, and Iraq was financially broke as a result. Kuwait was a weak-but-wealthy oil-rich neighbor, easy to take in a war that would bring Iraqi nationalism (a "unified Iraq") and the money they desparately needed to "pay widow & orphan pensions." Please to note the crying linguist in the transcripts at this point - good stuff.
His two biggest concerns were with Israel & Iran attacking him, or US support of another Arab state in conflict with himself. He is concerned with cicles of the CIA & State Dep't who he believes are working against him, but emphatically denies any implication towards Bush or Baker. Hussein believes the US media was working against him, even discussing the Diane Sawyer piece on him at the time, which elicits a great response from Glaspie, even if blatantly untrue.
A poor Iraq with low oil prices cannot rebuild, and Saddam knew the US wanted low oil prices and nothing else. So he spells out his position in contrast to ours, in one single statement that shall conclude this diary:
The spearheads (for the USG) have been Kuwait and the UAE, Saddam said. Saddam said carefully that just as Iraq will not threatenothers, it will accept no threat against itself. "We hope the USG will not misunderstand:" Iraq accepts, as the State Department spokesman said, that any country may choose its friends. But the USG knows that it was Iraq, not the USG, which decisively protected those USG friends during the war - and that is understandable since public opinion in the USG, to say nothing of geography, would have made it impossible for the Americans to accept 10,000 dead in a single battle, as Iraq did.
Saddam was a very, very smart man. While we have been told again and again how evil he was - and I'm not here to prove/defend such - nothing in his nature could have anticipated the duplicity that was dealt to him.
How different the world may be right now had the US not lied him into a safe feeling while invading Kuwait...
...no bases in Saudi Arabia...
...no bases in Kuwait...
...no bases in Iraq...
...and the biggest reason for 9/11 would never have been.
Links:
Declassified NSC fax (PDF)
Is the US State Department still keeping April Glaspie under wraps? by Kaleem Omar
Online reproduction of 1990 NYT article of Glaspie/Hussein/Aziz conversation transcript.